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Abstract
Quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong “quantum
access” security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider
classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and
decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We
define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic
security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical
CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard
PRF-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives.
We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that
leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the
adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by
contrast, recovering the key requires a linear number of decryption queries. The algorithm at the
core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We
emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their
stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that,
if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in
an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical
ones.
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1 Introduction
Large-scale quantum computers pose a dramatic threat to classical cryptography. The ability
of such devices to run Shor’s efficient quantum factoring algorithm (and its variants) would
lead to devastation of the currently deployed public-key cryptography infrastructure [8, 25].
This threat has led to significant work on so-called “post-quantum” alternatives, where a
prominent category is occupied by cryptosystems based on the Learning with Errors (LWE)
problem of solving noisy linear equations over Zq [23] and its variants [8, 22].
In addition to motivating significant work on post-quantum cryptosystems, the threat
of quantum computers has spurred general research on secure classical cryptography in the
presence of quantum adversaries. One area in particular explores security models where
a quantum adversary gains quantum control over portions of a classical cryptosystem. In
such models, a number of basic symmetric-key primitives can be broken by simple quantum
attacks based on Simon’s algorithm [16, 17, 15, 24, 26]. It is unclear if the assumption behind
these models is plausible for typical physical implementations of symmetric-key cryptography.
However, attacks that involve quantumly querying a classical function are always available
in scenarios where the adversary has access to a circuit for the relevant function. This is the
case for hashing, public-key encryption, and circuit obfuscation. Moreover, understanding
this model is crucial for gauging the degree to which any physical cryptographic device
must be resistant to reverse engineering or forced quantum behavior (consider the so-called
“frozen smart card” example [10]). For instance, one may reasonably ask: what happens to
the security of a classical cryptosystem when the device leaks only a single quantum query to
the adversary?
When deciding which functions the adversary might have (quantum) access to, it is worth
recalling the classical setting. For classical symmetric-key encryption, a standard approach
considers the security of cryptosystems when exposed to so-called chosen-plaintext attacks
(CPA). This notion encompasses all attacks in which an adversary attempts to defeat security
(by, e.g., distinguishing ciphertexts or extracting key information) using oracle access to
the function which encrypts plaintexts with the secret key. This approach has been highly
successful in developing cryptosystems secure against a wide range of realistic real-world
attacks. An analogous class, the so-called chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), are attacks in
which the adversary can make use of oracle access to decryption. For example, a well-known
attack due to Bleichenbacher [4] only requires access to an oracle that decides if the input
ciphertext is encrypted according to a particular RSA standard. We will consider analogues
of both CPA and CCA attacks, in which the relevant functions are quantumly accessible to
the adversary.
Prior works have formalized the quantum-accessible model for classical cryptography in
several settings, including unforgeable message authentication codes and digital signatures [6,
5], encryption secure against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (QCPA) [7, 10], and encryption
secure against adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks (QCCA2) [6].
1.1 Our Contributions
1.1.1 The model
In this work, we define a quantum-secure model of encryption called QCCA1. This model
grants non-adaptive access to the decryption oracle, and is thus intermediate between QCPA
and QCCA2. Studying weaker and intermediate models is a standard and useful practice in
cryptography. In fact, CPA and CCA2 are intermediate models themselves, being strictly
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weaker than authenticated encryption. Our particular intermediate model is naturally
motivated: it is sufficent for a new and interesting quantum attack on LWE encryption.
As is typical, the “challenge” in QCCA1 can be semantic, or take the form of an indis-
tinguishability test. This leads to natural security notions for symmetric-key encryption,
which we call IND-QCCA1 and SEM-QCCA1, respectively. Following previous works, it is
straightforward to prove that IND-QCCA1 and SEM-QCCA1 are equivalent [7, 10, 6].
We prove IND-QCCA1 security for two symmetric-key encryption schemes, based on
standard assumptions. Specifically, we show that the standard encryption scheme based on
quantum-secure pseudorandom functions (QPRF) is IND-QCCA1-secure. We remark that
QPRFs can be constructed from quantum-secure one-way functions [28]. Our security proofs
use a novel technique, in which we control the amount of information that the adversary can
extract from the oracles and store in their internal quantum state (prior to the challenge) by
means of a certain bound on quantum random-access codes.
1.1.2 A quantum-query attack on LWE
We then revisit the aforementioned question: what happens to a post-quantum cryptosystem
if it leaks a single quantum query? Our main result is that standard IND-CPA-secure LWE-
based encryption schemes can be completely broken using only a single quantum decryption
query and no other queries or leakage of any kind. In our attack, the adversary recovers the
complete secret key with constant success probability. In standard bit-by-bit LWE encryption,
a single classical decryption query can yield at most one bit of the secret key; the classical
analogue of our attack thus requires n log q queries. The attack is essentially an application of
a modulo-q variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [3]. Our new analysis shows that this
algorithm correctly recovers the key with constant success probability, despite the decryption
function only returning an inner product which is rounded to one of two values. We show
that the attack applies to four variants of standard IND-CPA-secure LWE-based encryption:
the symmetric-key and public-key systems originally described by Regev [23], the FrodoPKE
scheme1 [18, 1], and standard Ring-LWE [19, 20].
1.1.3 Important caveats
Our results challenge the idea that LWE is unconditionally “just as secure” quantumly as
it is classically. Nonetheless, the reader is cautioned to interpret our work carefully. Our
results do not indicate a weakness in LWE (or any LWE-based cryptosystem) in the standard
post-quantum security model. Since it is widely believed that quantum-algorithmic attacks
will need to be launched over purely classical channels, post-quantum security does not allow
for quantum queries to encryption or decryption oracles. Moreover, while our attack does
offer a dramatic quantum speedup (i.e., one query vs. linear queries), the classical attack is
already efficient. The schemes we attack are already insecure in the classical chosen-ciphertext
setting, but can be modified to achieve chosen-ciphertext security [9].
1 FrodoPKE is an IND-CPA-secure building block in the IND-CCA2-secure post-quantum cryptosystem
“FrodoKEM” [1]. Our results do not affect the post-quantum security of Frodo and do not contradict
the CCA2 security of FrodoKEM.
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1.1.4 Related work
We remark that Grilo, Kerenidis and Zijlstra recently observed that a version of LWE with
so-called “quantum samples” can be solved efficiently (as a learning problem) using Bernstein-
Vazirani [14]. Our result, by contrast, demonstrates an actual cryptographic attack on
standard cryptosystems based on LWE, in a plausible security setting. Moreover, in terms
of solving the learning problem, our analysis shows that constant success probability is
achievable with only a single query, whereas [14] require a number of queries which is at least
linear in the modulus q. In particular, our cryptographic attack succeeds with a single query
even for superpolynomial modulus.
1.2 Technical summary of results
1.2.1 Security model and basic definitions
We set down the basic QCCA1 security model, adapting the ideas of [5, 10]. An encryption
scheme is a triple Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) of algorithms (key generation, encryption, and
decryption, respectively) satisfying Deck(Enck(m)) = m for any key k ← KeyGen and message
m. In what follows, all oracles are quantum, meaning a function f is accessed by the unitary
|x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉. We define indistinguishability and semantic security as follows.
I Definition 1 (informal). Π is IND-QCCA1 if no quantum polynomial-time algorithm (QPT)
A can succeed at the following experiment with probability better than 1/2 + negl(n).
1. A key k ← KeyGen(1n) and a uniformly random bit b $←−{0, 1} are generated; A gets
access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs (m0,m1);
2. A gets Enck(mb) and access to an oracle for Enck, and outputs a bit b′; A wins if b = b′.
I Definition 2 (informal). Consider the following game with a QPT A.
1. A key k ← KeyGen(1n) is generated; A gets access to oracles Enck, Deck and outputs
circuits (Samp, h, f);
2. Sample m ← Samp; A receives h(m), Enck(m), and access to an oracle for Enck only,
and outputs a string s; A wins if s = f(m).
Then Π is SEM-QCCA1 if for every QPT A there exists a QPT S with the same winning
probability but which does not get Enck(m) in step 2.
I Theorem 3. A symmetric-key encryption scheme is IND-QCCA1 if and only if it is
SEM-QCCA1.
1.2.2 Secure constructions
Next, we show that standard pseudorandom-function-based encryption is QCCA1-secure,
provided that the underlying PRF is quantum-secure (i.e., is a QPRF.) A QPRF can be
constructed from any quantum-secure one-way function, or directly from the LWE assump-
tion [28]. Given a PRF f = {fk}k, define PRFscheme[f ] to be the scheme which encrypts a
plaintext m using randomness r via Enck(m; r) = (r, fk(r)⊕m) and decrypts in the obvious
way.
I Theorem 4. If f is a QPRF, then PRFscheme[f ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
In the full version of this work, we also analyze a standard permutation-based scheme.
Quantum-secure PRPs (i.e., QPRPs) can be obtained from quantum-secure one-way functions
[29]. Given a PRP P = {Pk}k, define PRPscheme[P ] to be the scheme that encrypts a
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plaintext m using randomness r via Enck(m; r) = Pk(m||r), where || denotes concatenation;
to decrypt, apply P−1k and discard r.
I Theorem 5. If P is a QPRP, then PRPscheme[P ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
We briefly describe our proof techniques for Theorems 4 and 5. In the indistinguishability
game, the adversary can use the decryption oracle prior to the challenge to (quantumly)
encode information about the relevant pseudorandom function instance (i.e., fk or Pk) in his
private, poly-sized quantum memory. To establish security, it is enough to show that this
encoded information cannot help the adversary compute the value of the relevant function at
the particular randomness used in the challenge. To prove this, we use a bound on quantum
random access codes (QRAC), where, informally, a QRAC is a mapping from N -bit strings x
to d-dimensional states %x, such that given %x, and any j ∈ [N ], xj can be recovered with
some probability.
I Lemma 6. The average bias of a quantum random access code with shared randomness
that encodes N bits into a d-dimensional quantum state is O(
√
N−1 log d). In particular, if
N = 2n and d = 2poly(n) the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)).
1.2.3 Key recovery against LWE
Our attack on LWE encryption uses a new analysis of a large-modulus variant of the Bernstein-
Vazirani algorithm [3], in the presence of a certain type of “rounding” noise.
1.2.4 Quantum algorithm for linear rounding functions
Given integers n ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2, define a keyed family of (binary) linear rounding functions,
LRFk,q : Znq −→ {0, 1}, with key k ∈ Znq , as follows:
LRFk,q(x) :=
{
0 if |〈x,k〉| ≤ b q4c,
1 otherwise.
Here 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner product modulo q. Our main technical contribution is the
following.
I Theorem 7 (informal). There exists a quantum algorithm that runs in time O(n), makes
one quantum query to LRFk,q (with unknown k ∈ Znq ), and outputs k with probability
4/pi2 −O(1/q).
We also show that the same algorithm succeeds against more generalized function classes,
in which the oracle indicates which “segment” of Zq the exact inner product belongs to.
1.2.5 One quantum query against LWE
Finally, we revisit our central question of interest: what happens to a post-quantum cryptosys-
tem if it leaks a single quantum query? We show that, in standard LWE-based schemes, the
decryption function can (with some simple modifications) be viewed as a special case of a lin-
ear rounding function, as above. In standard symmetric-key or public-key LWE, for instance,
we decrypt a ciphertext (a, c) ∈ Zn+1q with key k by outputting 0 if |c− 〈a,k〉| ≤
⌊
q
4
⌋
and 1
otherwise. In standard Ring-LWE, we decrypt a ciphertext (u, v) with key k (here u, v, k are
polynomials in Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉) by outputting 0 if the constant coefficient of v− k · u is small,
and 1 otherwise.
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Each of these schemes is secure against adversaries with classical encryption oracle access,
under the LWE assumption. If adversaries also gain classical decryption access, then it’s not
hard to see that a linear number of queries is necessary and sufficient to recover the private
key. Our main result is that, by contrast, only a single quantum decryption query is required
to achieve this total break. Indeed, in all three constructions described above, one can use
the decryption oracle to build an associated oracle for a linear rounding function which hides
the secret key. The following can then be shown using Theorem 7.
I Theorem 8 (informal). Let Π be standard LWE or standard Ring-LWE encryption (either
symmetric-key, or public-key.) Let n be the security parameter. Then there is an efficient
quantum algorithm that runs in time O(n), uses one quantum query to the decryption function
Deck of Π,and outputs the secret key with constant probability.
It’s natural to ask whether a similar quantum speedup can be achieved using encryption
queries. In the full version of this article, we show that this is possible in a model in which
the adversary is allowed to select some of the random coins used to encrypt.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline preliminary
ideas that we will make use of, including cryptographic concepts, and notions from quantum
algorithms. In Section 3, we define the QCCA1 model, including the two equivalent versions
IND-QCCA1 and SEM-QCCA1. In Section 4, we define the PRF scheme, and show that they
are IND-QCCA1-secure. In Section 5, we show how a generalization of the Bernstein-Vazirani
algorithm works with probability bounded from below by a constant, even when the oracle
outputs rounded values. In Section 6, we use the results of Section 5 to prove that a
single quantum decryption query is enough to recover the secret key in various versions of
LWE-encryption.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic notation and conventions
Selecting an element x uniformly at random from a finite set X will be written as x $←−X. If
we are generating a vector or matrix with entries in Zq by sampling each entry independently
according to a distribution χ on Zq, we will write, e.g., v χ←−Znq . Given a matrix A, AT will
denote the transpose of A. We will view elements v of Znq as column vectors; the notation
vT then denotes the corresponding row vector. The notation negl(n) denotes some function
of n which is smaller than every inverse-polynomial. We denote the concatenation of strings
x and y by x||y. We abbreviate classical probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms as PPT
algorithms. By quantum algorithm (or QPT) we mean a polynomial-time uniform family of
quantum circuits, where each circuit in the family is described by a sequence of unitary gates
and measurements. In general, such an algorithm may receive (mixed) quantum states as
inputs and produce (mixed) quantum states as outputs. Sometimes we will restrict QPTs
implicitly; for example, if we write Pr[A(1n) = 1] for a QPT A, it is implicit that we are only
considering those QPTs that output a single classical bit.
A function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}` defines a unitary operator Uf : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕ f(x)〉
on m+ ` qubits where x ∈ {0, 1}m and y ∈ {0, 1}`. When we say that a quantum algorithm
A gets (adaptive) quantum oracle access to f (written Af ), we mean that A can apply Uf .
Recall that a symmetric-key encryption scheme is a triple of classical probabilistic algorithms
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(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) whose run-times are polynomial in some security parameter n. Such a
scheme must satisfy the following property: when a key k is sampled by running KeyGen(1n),
then it holds that Deck(Enck(m)) = m for all m except with negligible probability in n. In
this work, all encryption schemes will be fixed-length, i.e., the length of the message m will
be a fixed (at most polynomial) function of n.
Since the security notions we study are unachievable in the information-theoretic setting,
all adversaries will be modeled by QPTs. When security experiments require multiple rounds
of interaction with the adversary, A is implicitly split into multiple QPTs (one for each
round), and each algorithm forwards its internal (quantum) state to the next algorithm in
the sequence.
2.2 Quantum-secure pseudorandomness
Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}` be an efficiently computable function, where n,m, ` are
integers and where f defines a family of functions {fk}k∈{0,1}n with fk(x) = f(k, x). We say
f is a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (or QPRF) if, for every QPT A,∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
k
$←− {0,1}n
[Afk(1n) = 1]− Pr
g
$←−F`m
[Ag(1n) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n) . (1)
Here F`m denotes the set of all functions from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}`. The standard method for
constructing a pseudorandom function from a one-way function produces a QPRF, provided
that the one-way function is quantum-secure [13, 12, 28].
2.3 Quantum random access codes
A quantum random access code (QRAC) is a two-party scheme for the following scenario
involving two parties Alice and Bob [21]:
1. Alice gets x ∈ {0, 1}N and encodes it as a d-dimensional quantum state %x.
2. Bob receives %x from Alice, and some index i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and is asked to recover the
i-th bit of x, by performing some measurement on %x.
3. They win if Bob’s output agrees with xi and lose otherwise.
We can view a QRAC scheme as a pair of (not necessarily efficient) quantum algorithms:
one for encoding, and another for decoding. We remark that the definition of a QRAC does
not bound on the size of %x; the interesting question is with what parameters a QRAC can
actually exist.
A variation of the above scenario allows Alice and Bob to use shared randomness in
their encoding and decoding operations [2]. Hence, Alice and Bob can pursue probabilistic
strategies with access to the same random variable.
Define the average bias of a QRAC with shared randomness as  = pwin − 1/2, where pwin
is the winning probability averaged over x $←−{0, 1}N and i $←−{1, . . . , N}.
3 The QCCA1 security model
3.1 Quantum oracles
In our setting, adversaries will (at various times) have quantum oracle access to the classical
functions Enck and Deck. The case of the deterministic decryption function Deck is simple:
the adversary gets access to the unitary operator UDeck : |c〉|m〉 7→ |c〉|m ⊕ Deck(c)〉. For
encryption, to satisfy IND-CPA security, Enck must be probabilistic and thus does not
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correspond to any single unitary operator. Instead, each encryption oracle call of the adversary
will be answered by applying a unitary sampled uniformly from the family {UEnck,r}r where
UEnck,r : |m〉|c〉 7→ |m〉|c⊕ Enck(m; r)〉
and r varies over all possible values of the randomness register of Enck. Note that, since
Enck and Deck are required to be probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms provided by the
underlying classical symmetric-key encryption scheme, both UEnck,r and UDeck correspond to
efficient and reversible quantum operations. For the sake of brevity, we adopt the convenient
notation Enck and Deck to refer to the above quantum oracles for encryption and decryption
respectively.
3.2 Ciphertext indistinguishability
We now define indistinguishability of encryptions (for classical, symmetric-key schemes)
against non-adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks.
I Definition 9 (IND-QCCA1). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, A a
QPT, and n the security parameter. Define IndGame(Π,A, n) as follows.
1. Setup: A key k ← KeyGen(1n) and a bit b $←−{0, 1} are generated;
2. Pre-challenge: A gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs (m0,m1);
3. Challenge: A gets Enck(mb) and access to Enck only, and outputs a bit b′;
4. Resolution: A wins if b = b′.
Then Π has indistinguishable encryptions under non-adaptive quantum chosen ciphertext
attack (or is IND-QCCA1) if, for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
By inspection, one immediately sees that our definition lies between the established
notions of IND-QCPA and IND-QCCA2 [7, 10, 6]. It will later be convenient to work with a
variant of the game IndGame, which we now define.
I Definition 10 (IndGame′). We define the experiment IndGame′(Π,A, n) as
IndGame(Π,A, n), except that in the pre-challenge phase A only outputs a single message m,
and in the challenge phase A receives Enck(m) if b = 0, and Enck(x) for a uniformly random
message x if b = 1.
Working with IndGame′ rather than IndGame does not change security. Specifically (as
we show in Appendix B), Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if, for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame′(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
3.3 Semantic security
In semantic security, rather than choosing a pair of challenge plaintexts, the adversary
chooses a challenge template: a triple of circuits (Samp, h, f), where Samp outputs plaintexts
from some distribution DSamp, and h and f are functions with domain the support of DSamp.
The intuition is that Samp is a distribution of plaintexts m for which the adversary, if
given information h(m) about m together with an encryption of m, can produce some new
information f(m).
I Definition 11 (SEM-QCCA1). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme, and
consider the following experiment, SemGame(b), (with parameter b ∈ {real, sim}) with a
QPT A:
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1. Setup: A key k ← KeyGen(1n) is generated;
2. Pre-challenge: A gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and outputs a challenge template
(Samp, h, f);
3. Challenge: A plaintext m $←− Samp is generated; A receives h(m) and gets access to an
oracle for Enck only; if b = real, A also receives Enck(m); A outputs a string s;
4. Resolution: A wins if s = f(m).
We say Π has semantic security under non-adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (or is
SEM-QCCA1) if, for every QPT A, there exists a QPT S such that the challenge templates
output by A and S are identically distributed, and∣∣Pr[A wins SemGame(real)]− Pr[S wins SemGame(sim)]∣∣ ≤ negl(n) .
Our definition is a straightforward modification of SEM-QCPA [10, 6]; the modification is
to give A and S oracle access to Deck in the pre-challenge phase.
I Theorem 12. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Then,
Π is IND-QCCA1-secure if and only if Π is SEM-QCCA1-secure.
The classical proof of the above (see, e.g., [11]) carries over to the quantum case. This
was already observed for the case of QCPA by [10], and extends easily to the case where both
the adversary and the simulator gain oracle access to Deck in the pre-challenge phase.2
4 Secure Constructions
4.1 PRF scheme
Let us first recall the standard symmetric-key encryption based on pseudorandom functions.
I Construction 13 (PRF scheme). Let n be the security parameter and let f : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n be an efficient family of functions {fk}k. Then, the symmetric-key
encryption scheme PRFscheme[f ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
1. KeyGen: output k $←−{0, 1}n;
2. Enc: to encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}n, choose r $←−{0, 1}n and output (r, fk(r)⊕m);
3. Dec: to decrypt (r, c) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, output c⊕ fk(r);
We chose a simple set of parameters for the PRF, so that key length, input size, and
output size are all equal to the security parameter. It is straightforward to check that the
definition (and our results) are valid for any polynomial-size parameter choices. We show
that the above scheme satisfies QCCA1, provided that the underlying PRF is secure against
quantum queries.
I Theorem 14. If f is a QPRF, then PRFscheme[f ] is IND-QCCA1-secure.
Proof. Fix a QPT adversary A, split into pre-challenge algorithm A1 and challenge algorithm
A2, against Π := PRFscheme[f ] = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec). Let n denote the security parameter.
We will work with the single-message variant of IndGame, IndGame′, described below as
Game 0. In Appendix B, we show that Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if no QPT adversary can
win IndGame′ with non-negligible bias. We first show that a version of IndGame′ where we
2 In fact, the proof works even if Deck access is maintained during the challenge, so the result is really
that IND-QCCA2 is equivalent to SEM-QCCA2.
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replace f with a random function, called Game 1 below, is indistinguishable from IndGame′,
so that the winning probabilities cannot differ by a non-negligible amount. We then prove
that no adversary can win Game 1 with non-negligible bias by showing how any adversary
for Game 1 can be used to make a quantum random access code with the same bias.
1n A1
|ψ〉
m∗ Φb c
∗ A2 b′
Enck Deck Enck
Figure 1 IndGame′ from Definition 10.
Game 0. This is the game IndGame′(Π,A, n), which we briefly review for convenience (see
also Figure 1). In the pre-challenge phase, A1 gets access to oracles Enck and Deck, and
outputs a message m∗ while keeping a private state |ψ〉 for the challenge phase. In the
challenge phase, a random bit b $←−{0, 1} is sampled, and A2 is run on input |ψ〉 and a
challenge ciphertext
c∗ := Φb(m∗) :=
{
Enck(m∗) if b = 0,
Enck(x) if b = 1.
Here Enck(x) := (r∗, fk(r∗)⊕x) where r∗ and x are sampled uniformly at random. In the
challenge phase, A2 only has access to Enck and must output a bit b′. A wins if δbb′ = 1,
so we call δbb′ the outcome of the game.
Game 1. This is the same game as Game 0, except we replace fk with a uniformly random
function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
First, we show that for any adversary A, the outcome when A plays Game 0 is at most
negligibly different from the outcome when A plays Game 1. We do this by constructing a
quantum distinguisher D that distinguishes QPRF {fk}k from a true random function, with
advantage
∣∣Pr[1← Game 0]− Pr[1← Game 1]∣∣, which must then be negligible since f is
a QPRF. The distinguisher D gets quantum oracle access to a function g, which is either
fk, for a random k, or a random function, and proceeds by simulating A playing IndGame′
as follows:
1. Run A1, answering encryption queries using calls to g instead of fk, and decryption
queries using quantum oracle calls to g: |r〉|c〉|m〉 7→ |r〉|c〉|m⊕ c〉 7→ |r〉|c〉|m⊕ c⊕ g(r)〉 ;
2. Simulate the challenge phase by sampling b $←−{0, 1} and encrypting the challenge using g
in place of fk; run A2 and simulate encryption queries as before;
3. When A2 outputs b′, output δbb′ .
To show that no QPT adversary can win Game 1 with non-negligible probability, we
design a QRAC from any adversary, and use the lower bound on the bias given in Lemma 6.
Intuition: In an encryption query, A1 or A2, queries a message, or superposition of
messages
∑
m |m〉, and gets back
∑
m |m〉|r,m⊕ F (r)〉 for a random r, from which he can
easily obtain (r, F (r)). So in essence, an encryption query is just classically sampling a
random point of F .
In a decryption query, which is only available to A1, the adversary sends a ciphertext,
or a superposition of ciphertexts,
∑
r,c |r, c〉 and gets back
∑
r,c |r, c〉|c⊕ F (r)〉, from which
he can learn
∑
r |r, F (r)〉. Thus, a decryption query allows A1 to query F , in superposition.
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Later in the challenge phase, A2 gets an encryption (r∗,m ⊕ F (r∗)) and must decide if
m = m∗. Since A2 no longer has access to the decryption oracle, which allows him to query
F , there seem to be two possible ways A2 could learn F (r∗):
1. A2 gets lucky in one of his poly(n) queries to Enck and happens to sample (r∗, F (r∗));
2. Or, A is somehow able to use what he learned while he had access to Deck, and thus F ,
to learn F (r∗), meaning that the poly(n)-sized quantum memory A1 sends to A2, that
can depend on queries to F , but which cannot depend on r∗, allows A2 to learn F (r∗).
The first possibility is exponentially unlikely, since there are 2n possibilities for r∗. As we
will see shortly, the second possibility would imply a very strong quantum random access
code. It would essentially allow A1 to interact with F , which contains 2n values, and make
a state, which must necessarily be of polynomial size, such that A2 can use that state to
recover F (r∗) for any of the 2n possible values of r∗, with high probability. We now formalize
this intuition. To clarify notation, we will use boldface to denote the shared randomness
bitstrings.
Bits to be encoded:
b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1}
Bit to be recovered:
j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
Shared randomness:
s,y1, . . . ,y2n , r1, . . . , r` ∈ {0, 1}n
QRAC Encoding QRAC Decoding
A1 A2 b
′
m (r,m⊕ f˜(r))
Enc query
r $←−{0, 1}n
(r, c) c⊕ f˜(r)
Dec query
mi (ri,mi ⊕ f˜(ri))
i-th Enc query
f˜(r1), . . . , f˜(r`)
|ψ〉
m∗
Φj
c∗
(j,m∗ ⊕ yj)
f˜(r) :=
{
yr if br = 0
yr ⊕ s if br = 1
Figure 2 Quantum random access code construction for the PRF scheme.
Construction of a quantum random access code. Let A be a QPT adversary with winning
probability p. Let ` = poly(n) be an upper bound on the number of queries made by A2.
Recall that a random access code consists of an encoding procedure that takes (in this case)
2n bits b1, . . . , b2n , and outputs a state % of dimension (in this case) 2poly(n), such that a
decoding procedure, given % and an index j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} outputs bj with some success
probability. We define a quantum random access code as follows (see also Figure 2).
Encoding. Let b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} be the string to be encoded. Let s,y1, . . . ,y2n ∈ {0, 1}n
be the first n(1 + 2n) bits of the shared randomness, and let r1, . . . , r` ∈ {0, 1}n be
the next `n bits. Define f˜ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as follows. For r ∈ {0, 1}n, we slightly
abuse notation by letting r denote the corresponding integer value between 1 and
2n. Define f˜(r) = yr ⊕ brs. Run A1, answering encryption and decryption queries
using f˜ in place of F . Let m∗ and |ψ〉 be the outputs of A1 (see Figure 1). Output
% = (|ψ〉,m∗, f˜(r1), . . . , f˜(r`)).
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Figure 3 Dividing Zq into c = dq/be blocks, starting from a. The first c − 1 blocks, labelled
I0(a, b), . . . , Ic−2(a, b), have size b and the last, labelled Ic−1(a, b), contains the remaining b−(cb−q) ≤
b elements of Zq.
Decoding. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} be the index of the bit to be decoded (so given % as above,
the goal is to recover bj). Decoding will make use of the values s,y1, . . . ,y2n , r1, . . . , r`
given by the shared randomness. Upon receiving a query j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, run A2 with
inputs |ψ〉 and (j,m∗ ⊕ yj). On A2’s i-th encryption oracle call, use randomness ri, so
that if the input to the oracle is |m, c〉, the state returned is |m, c⊕ (ri,m⊕ f˜(ri))〉 (note
that f˜(ri) is given as part of %). Return the bit b′ output by A2.
Average bias of the code. We claim that the average probability of decoding correctly,
taken over all choices of b1, . . . , b2n ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, is exactly p, the success
probability of A. To see this, first note that from A’s perspective, this is exactly Game 1:
the function f˜ is a uniformly random function, and the queries are responded to just as in
Game 1. Further, note that if bj = 0, then m∗ ⊕ yj = m∗ ⊕ f˜(j), so the correct guess for
A2 would be 0, and if bj = 1, then m∗ ⊕ yj = m∗ ⊕ f˜(j)⊕ s = x⊕ f˜(j) for the uniformly
random string x = m∗ ⊕ s, so the correct guess for A2 would be 1.
Therefore, the average bias of the code is p− 1/2. We also observe that % has dimension
at most 2poly(n), since |ψ〉 must be a poly(n)-qubit state (A1 only runs for poly(n) time),
and `, the number of queries made by A2 must be poly(n), since A2 only runs for poly(n)
time. As this code encodes 2n bits into a state of dimension 2poly(n), by Lemma 6 (proven in
Appendix A), the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)) = negl(n), so p ≤ 12 + negl(n). J
5 Quantum algorithm for linear rounding functions
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [3] with a
modified version of the oracle. While the original oracle computes the inner product modulo
q, our version only gives partial information about it by rounding its value to one of dq/be
blocks of size b, for some b ∈ {1, . . . , q− 1} (if b does not divide q, one of the blocks will have
size < b).
I Definition 15. Let n ≥ 1 be an integer and q ≥ 2 be an integer modulus. Let a ∈ Zq,
b ∈ Zq \ {0} and c := dq/be. We partition Zq into c disjoint blocks (most of them of size b)
starting from a as follows (see Figure 3):
Iv(a, b) :=
{
{a+ vb, . . . , a+ vb+ b− 1} if v ∈ {0, . . . , c− 2},
{a+ vb, . . . , a+ q − 1} if v = c− 1.
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Based on this partition, we define a family LRFk,a,b : Znq −→ Zc of keyed linear rounding
functions, with key k ∈ Znq , as follows:
LRFk,a,b(x) := v if 〈x,k〉 ∈ Iv(a, b).
Algorithm 1: Bernstein-Vazirani for linear rounding functions.
Parameters :n, q, b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, c = dq/be.
Input :Quantum oracle ULRF : |x〉|z〉 7→ |x〉|z + LRFk,a,b(x) (mod c)〉 where
x ∈ Znq , z ∈ Zc and LRFk,a,b is the rounded inner product function for
some unknown k ∈ Znq and a ∈ Zq.
Output : String k˜ ∈ Znq such that k˜ = k with high probability.
1. Prepare the uniform superposition and append 1√
c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉 where ωc = e2pii/c:
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
|x〉 ⊗ 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
2. Query oracle ULRF for LRFk,a,b; obtain
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω
−LRFk,a,b(x)
c |x〉 ⊗ 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
3. Discard the last register and apply the quantum Fourier transform QFT⊗nZq .
4. Measure in the computational basis and output the outcome k˜.
The following theorem shows that the modulo-q variant of the Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
(Algorithm 1) can recover k with constant probability of success by using only a single quantum
query to LRFk,a,b. The proof is a fairly straightforward computation through the steps of
the algorithm, and can be found in Appendix C.
I Theorem 16. Let ULRF be the quantum oracle for the linear rounding function LRFk,a,b
with modulus q ≥ 2, block size b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, and an unknown a ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, and
unknown key k ∈ Znq such that k has at least one entry that is a unit modulo q. Let c = dq/be
and d = cb− q. By making one query to the oracle ULRF, Algorithm 1 recovers the key k with
probability at least 4/pi2 −O(d/q).
6 Key recovery against LWE
In this section, we consider various LWE-based encryption schemes and show using Theorem 16
that the decryption key can be efficiently recovered using a single quantum decryption query.
In the full version of this work, we also show that a single quantum encryption query can be
used to recover the secret key in a symmetric-key version of LWE, as long as the querying
algorithm also has control over part of the randomness used in the encryption procedure.
6.1 Key recovery via one decryption query in symmetric-key LWE
Recall the following standard construction of an IND-CPA symmetric-key encryption scheme
based on the LWE assumption [23].
I Construction 17 (LWE-SKE [23]). Let n ≥ 1 be an integer, let q ≥ 2 be an integer modulus
and let χ be a discrete and symmetric error distribution. Then, the symmetric-key encryption
scheme LWE-SKE(n, q, χ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
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1. KeyGen: output k $←−Znq ;
2. Enck: to encrypt b ∈ {0, 1}, sample a $←−Znq , e χ←−Zq and output (a, 〈a,k〉+ b
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ e);
3. Deck: to decrypt (a, c), output 0 if |c− 〈a,k〉| ≤
⌊
q
4
⌋
, else output 1.
As a corollary of Theorem 16, an adversary that is granted a single quantum decryption
query can recover the key with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1):
I Corollary 18. There is a quantum algorithm that makes a single quantum query to
LWE-SKE.Deck and recovers the entire key k with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1).
Proof. LWE-SKE.Deck coincides with a linear rounding function LRFk′,a,b for a key k′ =
(−k, 1) ∈ Zn+1q , which has a unit in its last entry. In particular, b = dq/2e, and if q = 3
(mod 4), a = dq/4e, and otherwise, a = −bq/4c. Thus, by Theorem 16, Algorithm 1 makes
one quantum query to LRFk′,a,b, which can be implemented using one quantum query
to LWE-SKE.Deck, and recovers k′, and thus k, with probability 4/pi2 − O(d/q), where
d = dq/beb− q ≤ 1. J
Note that the key in this scheme consists of n log q uniformly random bits, and that a
classical decryption query yields at most a single bit of output. It follows that any algorithm
making t classical queries to the decryption oracle recovers the entire key with probability at
most 2t−n log q. A straightforward key-recovery algorithm does in fact achieve this.
6.2 Key recovery via one decryption query in public-key LWE
The key-recovery attack described in Corollary 18 required nothing more than the fact that
the decryption procedure of LWE-SKE is just a linear rounding function whose key contains
the decryption key. As a result, the attack is naturally applicable to other variants of LWE.
In this section, we consider two public-key variants. The first is the standard construction of
IND-CPA public-key encryption based on the LWE assumption, as introduced by Regev [23].
The second is the IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme FrodoPKE [1], which is based
on a construction of Lindner and Peikert [18]. In both cases, we demonstrate a dramatic
speedup in key recovery using quantum decryption queries.
We emphasize once again that key recovery against these schemes was already possible
classically using a linear number of decryption queries. Our results should thus not be inter-
preted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., IND-CPA).
The proper interpretation is that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext
attacks, then quantum attacks can be even more devastating than classical ones.
6.2.1 Regev’s public-key scheme
The standard construction of an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme based on LWE is
the following.
I Construction 19 (LWE-PKE [23]). Let m ≥ n ≥ 1 be integers, let q ≥ 2 be an integer
modulus, and let χ be a discrete error distribution over Zq. Then, the public-key encryption
scheme LWE-PKE(n, q, χ) = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
1. KeyGen: output a secret key sk = k $←−Znq and a public key pk = (A,Ak+e) ∈ Zm×(n+1)q ,
where A $←−Zm×nq , e χ←−Zmq , and all arithmetic is done modulo q.
2. Enc: to encrypt b ∈ {0, 1}, pick a random v ∈ {0, 1}m with Hamming weight roughly m/2
and output (vTA,vT(Ak + e) + bb q2c) ∈ Zn+1q , where vT denotes the transpose of v.
3. Dec: to decrypt (a, c), output 0 if |c− 〈a, sk〉| ≤ ⌊ q4⌋, else output 1.
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Although the encryption is now done in a public-key manner, all that matters for our purposes
is the decryption procedure, which is identical to the symmetric-key case, LWE-SKE. We
thus have the following corollary, whose proof is identical to that of Corollary 18:
I Corollary 20. There is a quantum algorithm that makes a single quantum query to
LWE-PKE.Decsk and recovers the entire key sk with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1).
6.2.2 Frodo public-key scheme
Next, we consider the IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme FrodoPKE, which is
based on a construction by Lindner and Peikert [18]. Compared to LWE-PKE, this scheme
significantly reduces the key-size and achieves better security estimates than the initial
proposal by Regev [23]. For a detailed discussion of FrodoPKE, we refer to [1]. We present
the entire scheme for completeness, but the important part for our purposes is the decryption
procedure.
I Construction 21 (FrodoPKE [1]). Let n, m¯, n¯ be integer parameters, q ≥ 2 an integer power
of 2. Let B denote the number of bits used for encoding, and let χ be a discrete symmetric
error distribution. The public-key encryption scheme FrodoPKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is
defined:
1. KeyGen: generate a matrix A $←−Zn×nq and matrices S,E χ←−Zn×n¯q ; compute B = AS +
E ∈ Zn×n¯q ; output the key-pair (pk, sk) with public key pk = (A,B) and secret key
sk = S.
2. Enc: to encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}B·m¯·n¯ (encoded as a matrix M ∈ Zm¯×n¯q with each entry
having 0s in all but the B most significant bits) with public key pk, sample error matrices
S′,E′ χ←−Zm¯×nq and E′′ χ←−Zm¯×n¯q ; compute C1 = S′A + E′ ∈ Zm¯×nq and C2 = M +
S′B +E′′ ∈ Zm¯×n¯q ; output the ciphertext (C1,C2).
3. Dec: to decrypt (C1,C2) ∈ Zm¯×nq × Zm¯×n¯q with secret-key sk = S, compute M =
C2 −C1S ∈ Zm¯×n¯q . For each (i, j) ∈ [m¯]× [n¯], output the first B bits of Mi,j.
We now show how to recover m¯ of the n¯ columns of the secret key S using a single
quantum query to FrodoPKE.DecS . If m¯ = n¯, as in sample parameters given in [1], then this
algorithm recovers S completely.
I Theorem 22. There exists a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to
FrodoPKE.DecS and recovers any choice of m¯ of the n¯ columns of S. For each of the
chosen columns, if that column has at least one odd entry, then the algorithm succeeds in
recovering the column with probability at least 4/pi2.
We give a formal proof of Theorem 22 in Appendix D, but here we briefly sketch the proof.
Let s1, . . . , sn¯ be the columns of S. Let U denote the map:
U : |c〉|z1〉 . . . |zn¯〉 7→ |c〉|z1 + LRFs1,0,q/2B (c)〉 . . . |zn¯ + LRFsn¯,0,q/2B (c)〉,
for any c ∈ Znq and z1, . . . , zn¯ ∈ Z2B . By a straightforward calculation, one can show that a
single call to FrodoKEM.DecS , with C2 set of 0m¯×n¯, can be used to implement U⊗m¯. Then
we show that one call to U can be used to recover any choice of the columns of S with
probability 4/pi2, as long as it has at least one entry that is odd. To show this, we show that U
can be used to implement a phase query to LRFsj ,0,q/2B , by simply applying U to a state with
|ϕ〉 = 2−B/2∑2B−1z=0 |z〉 in each of n¯ registers except the j-th one, and 1√2B ∑2B−1z=0 ωz2B |z〉
in the j-th register. This ensures that the phase corresponding to LRFsj ,0,q/2B is kicked
back, but all other phases, corresponding to LRFsj′ ,0,q/2B for j′ 6= j are not. For details, see
Appendix D.
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6.3 Key recovery via one decryption query in public-key Ring-LWE
Next, we analyze key-recovery with a single quantum decryption query against Ring-LWE
encryption. Unlike the plain LWE-based encryption schemes we considered in the previous
sections, Ring-LWE encryption uses noisy samples over a polynomial ring. In the following,
we consider the basic, bit-by-bit Ring-LWE public-key encryption scheme introduced in
[19, 20]. It is based on the rings R = Z[x]/〈xn + 1〉 and Rq := R/qR = Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉 for
some power-of-two integer n and poly(n)-bounded prime modulus q. The details of the error
distribution χ below will not be relevant to our results.
I Construction 23 (Ring-LWE-PKE [19, 20]). Let n ≥ 1 be an integer, let q ≥ 2 be an
integer modulus, and let χ be an error distribution over R. The public-key encryption scheme
Ring-LWE-PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is defined as follows:
1. KeyGen: sample a $←−Rq and e, s χ←−R; output sk = s and pk = (a, c = a ·s+e (mod q)) ∈
R2q.
2. Enc: to encrypt b ∈ {0, 1}, sample r, e1, e2 χ←−R and output a ciphertext pair (u, v) ∈ R2q,
where u = a · r + e1 (mod q) and v = c · r + e2 + bbq/2c (mod q).
3. Dec: to decrypt (u, v), compute v − u · s = (r · e − s · e1 + e2) + bbq/2c (mod q) ∈ Rq;
output 0 if the constant term of the polynomial is closer to 0 than bq/2c, else output 1.
We note that our choice of placing single-bit encryption in the constant term of the
polynomial is somewhat arbitrary. Indeed, it is straightforward to extend our results to
encryption with respect to other monomials.
In the full version of the article, we show the following corollary to Theorem 16.
I Corollary 24. There is a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to Ring-LWE-
PKE.Decs and recovers the entire key s with probability at least 4/pi2 − o(1).
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A Bound for quantum random access codes
A variation of quantum random access codes allows Alice and Bob to use shared randomness
in their encoding and decoding operations [2] (note that shared randomness per se does not
allow them to communicate). We are interested in bounding the average bias  = pwin−1/2 of
a quantum random access code with shared randomness, where pwin is the winning probability
averaged over x $←−{0, 1}N and i $←−{1, . . . , N}.
I Lemma 25. The average bias of a quantum random access code with shared randomness
that encodes N bits into a d-dimensional quantum state is O(
√
N−1 log d). In particular, if
N = 2n and d = 2poly(n) the bias is O(2−n/2 poly(n)).
Proof. A quantum random access code with shared randomness that encodes N bits into a
d-dimensional quantum state is specified by the following:
a shared random variable λ,
for each x ∈ {0, 1}N , a d-dimensional quantum state %λx encoding x,
for each i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, an observable Mλi for recovering the i-th bit.
Formally, %λx andMλi are d×d Hermitian matrices such that %λx ≥ 0, Tr%λx = 1, and ‖Mλi ‖ ≤ 1
where ‖Mλi ‖ denotes the operator norm of Mλi . Note that both %λx and Mλi depend on the
shared random variable λ, meaning that Alice and Bob can coordinate their strategies.
The bias of correctly guessing xi, for a given x and i, is (−1)xiTr(%λxMλi )/2. If the average
bias of the code is  then Eλ Ex,i(−1)xiTr(%λxMλi ) ≥ 2. We can rearrange this expression
and upper bound each term using its operator norm, and then apply the noncommutative
Khintchine inequality [27]:
Eλ Ex
1
N
Tr
(
%λx
N∑
i=1
(−1)xiMλi
)
≤ Eλ Ex 1
N
‖
N∑
i=1
(−1)xiMλi ‖
≤ Eλ 1
N
c
√
N log d = c
√
log d
N
,
for some constant c. In other words,  ≤ c2
√
log d
N . In the particular case we are interested in,
d = 2poly(n) and N = 2n so  ≤ c2
√
poly(n)
2n , completing the proof. J
B Equivalence of QCCA1 models
Recall that the IND-QCCA1 notion is based on the security game IndGame defined in Defini-
tion 9. In the alternative security game IndGame′ (see Definition 10), the adversary provides
only one plaintext m and must decide if the challenge is an encryption of m or an encryption
of a random string. In this section, we prove the following:
I Proposition 26. An encryption scheme Π is IND-QCCA1 if and only if for every QPT A,
Pr[A wins IndGame′(Π,A, n)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n) .
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Proof. Fix a scheme Π. For one direction, suppose Π is IND-QCCA1 and let A be an
adversary against IndGame′. Define an adversary A0 against IndGame as follows: (i.) run A
until it outputs a challenge plaintext m, (ii.) sample random r and output (m, r), (iii.) run
the rest of A and output what it outputs. The output distribution of IndGame′(Π,A, n) is
then identical to IndGame(Π,A0, n), which in turn must be negligibly close to uniform by
IND-QCCA1 security of Π.
For the other direction, suppose no adversary can win IndGame′ with probability better
than 1/2, and let B be an adversary against IndGame. Now, define two adversaries B0 and B1
against IndGame′ as follows. The adversary Bc does: (i.) run B until it outputs a challenge
(m0,m1), (ii.) output mc, (iii.) run the rest of B and output what it outputs. Note that
the pre-challenge algorithm is identical for B, B0, and B1; define random variables M0, M1
and R given by the two challenges and a uniformly random plaintext, respectively. The
post-challenge algorithm is also identical for all three adversaries; call it C. The advantage of
B over random guessing is then bounded by
‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(M1))‖1
= ‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(M1))− C(Enck(R)) + C(Enck(R))‖1
≤ ‖C(Enck(M0))− C(Enck(R))‖1 + ‖C(Enck(M1))− C(Enck(R))‖1
≤ negl(n) ,
where the last inequality follows from our initial assumption, applied to both B0 and B1. It
follows that Π is IND-QCCA1. J
C Proof of Theorem 16
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 16, restated below for convenience.
I Theorem 16. Let ULRF be the quantum oracle for the linear rounding function LRFk,a,b
with modulus q ≥ 2, block size b ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, and an unknown a ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, and
unknown key k ∈ Znq such that k has at least one entry that is a unit modulo q. Let c = dq/be
and d = cb− q. By making one query to the oracle ULRF, Algorithm 1 recovers the key k with
probability at least 4/pi2 −O(d/q).
Proof. For an integer m, let ωm = e2pii/m. Several times in this proof, we will make use of
the identity
∑`−1
z=0 ω
rz
m = ω
r(`−1)/2
m
(
sin(`rpi/m)
sin(rpi/m)
)
.
Let c = dq/be. Throughout this proof, let LRF(x) = LRFk,a,b(x). By querying with
1√
c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉 in the second register, we are using the standard phase kickback technique,
which puts the output of the oracle directly into the phase:
|x〉 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉 ULRF7−→ |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z + LRF(x) (mod c)〉
= |x〉 1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωz−LRF(x)c |z〉 = ω−LRF(x)c |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
Thus, after querying the uniform superposition over the cipherspace with 1√
c
∑c−1
z=0 ω
z
c |z〉 in
the second register, we arrive at the state
1√
qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω−LRF(x)c |x〉
1√
c
c−1∑
z=0
ωzc |z〉.
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Note that ωc = ωq/cq . If we discard the last register and apply QFT⊗nZq , we get
|ψ〉 = 1
qn
∑
y∈Znq
∑
x∈Znq
ω−(q/c)LRF(x)+〈x,y〉q |y〉.
We then perform a complete measurement in the computational basis. The probability of
obtaining the key k is given by
|〈k|ψ〉|2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
∑
x∈Znq
ω
− qc LRF(x)+〈x,k〉
q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
c−1∑
v=0
ω
− qc v
q
∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (2)
We are assuming that k has at least one entry that is a unit modulo q. For simplicity,
suppose that entry is kn. Let k1:n−1 denote the first n − 1 entries of k. Then, for any
v ∈ {0, . . . , c− 2}:∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q =
∑
x∈Znq :〈x,k〉∈Iv(a,b)
ω〈x,k〉q
=
∑
y∈Zn−1q
ω〈y,k1:n−1〉q
∑
xn∈Zq :
xnkn∈Iv(a−〈y,k1:n−1〉,b)
ωxnknq . (3)
(Recall the definition of Iv(a, b) from Definition 15). Since kn is a unit, for each z ∈
Iv(a − 〈y,k1:n−1〉), there is a unique xn ∈ Zq such that xnkn = z. Thus, for a fixed
y ∈ Zn−1q , letting a′ = a− 〈y,k1:n−1〉, we have:
∑
xn∈Zq :xnkn∈Iv(a′,b)
ωxnknq =
a′+(v+1)b−1∑
z=a′+vb
ωzq = ωa
′+vb
q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq ,
which we can plug into (3) to get:
∑
x∈Znq :
LRF(x)=v
ω〈x,k〉q =
∑
y∈Zn−1q
ω〈y,k1:n−1〉q ω
a−〈y,k1:n−1〉+vb
q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq = qn−1ωa+vbq
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq . (4)
We can perform a similar analysis for the remaining case when v = c − 1. Recall that
d = cb− q ≥ 0 so vb = cb− b = d+ q − b = −(b− d) (mod q) and we get
∑
x∈Znq :LRF(x)=c−1
ω〈x,k〉q = qn−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−d−1∑
z=0
ωzq . (5)
This is slightly different from the v < c − 1 case, shown in (4), but very similar. If we
substitute v = c− 1 in (4) and compare it to (5), we get∣∣∣∣∣qn−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−d−1∑
z=0
ωzq − qn−1ωa−(b−d)q
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣
= qn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
b−1∑
z=b−d
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣ = qn−1
∣∣∣∣∣
d−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣ = qn−1
∣∣∣∣ sin(pid/q)sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣
≤ qn−1pid/q2/q = q
n−1pi
2 d. (6)
G. Alagic, S. Jeffery, M. Ozols, and A. Poremba 1:21
Above, we have used the facts sin x ≤ x, and |sin x| ≥ 2x/pi when |x| ≤ pi/2. Now, plugging
(4) into (2) for all the v < c − 1 terms, and using (6) and the triangle inequality for the
v = c− 1 term, we get:
|〈k|ψ〉| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣ 1qn
c−1∑
v=0
ω−qv/cq · qn−1ωa+vbq
b−1∑
z=0
ωzq
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣ 1qnω−q(c−1)/cq · qn−1pi2 d
∣∣∣∣
= 1
q
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣∣− pi2 dq
= 1
q
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q)
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
∣∣∣∣∣− pi2 dq . (7)
Since b− q/c = d/c, we can bound the sum as follows:∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωv(b−q/c)q
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
ωvd/cq
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
cos
(
2pi
q
vd
c
)∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣∣
c−1∑
v=0
cos
(
2pi
q
d
)∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣c cos(2pidq
)∣∣∣∣ (8)
≥ c
√
1− (2pid/q)2. (9)
To get the inequality (8), we used 0 ≤ v ≤ c and the assumption that d/q ≤ 1/4 (if d/q > 1/4,
the claim of the theorem is trivial), which implies that 2pivc
d
q ≤ pi2 . The last inequality follows
from |cosx| ≥ √1− x2.
Next, we bound sin(bpi/q)sin(pi/q) . When b/q ≤ 1/2, bpi/q ≤ pi/2, so we have sin(bpi/q) ≥ 2b/q.
We also have sin(pi/q) ≤ pi/q. Thus,
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q) ≥
2b
pi
.
On the other hand, when b/q > 1/2, we must have c = 2 and b = q+d2 . In that case
sin(bpi/q) = sin pi(q + d)2q = sin
(
pi
2 +
pi
2
d
q
)
= cos pid2q ≥
√
1−
(
pid
2q
)2
.
Since sin(pi/q) ≤ pi/q and q ≥ 2b,
sin(bpi/q)
sin(pi/q) ≥
√
1−
(
pid
2q
)2
pi/q
≥ 2b
pi
√
1−O(d/q).
Thus, in both cases, sin(bpi/q)sin(pi/q) ≥ 2bpi
√
1−O(d/q). Plugging this and (9) into (7), we get:
|〈k, ψ〉| ≥ 1
q
· 2b
pi
√
1−O(d/q) · c
√
1−O(d/q)−O(d/q)
= 2
pi
bc
q
−O(d/q) = 2
pi
q + d
q
−O(d/q) = 2
pi
−O(d/q),
completing the proof. J
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D Proof of Theorem 22
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 22, restated below for convenience.
I Theorem 22. There exists a quantum algorithm that makes one quantum query to
FrodoPKE.DecS and recovers any choice of m¯ of the n¯ columns of S. For each of the
chosen columns, if that column has at least one odd entry, then the algorithm succeeds in
recovering the column with probability at least 4/pi2.
Proof. Let s1, . . . , sn¯ be the columns of S. Let U denote the map:
U : |c〉|z1〉 . . . |zn¯〉 7→ |c〉|z1 + LRFs1,0,q/2B (c)〉 . . . |zn¯ + LRFsn¯,0,q/2B (c)〉,
for any c ∈ Znq and z1, . . . , zn¯ ∈ Z2B . We first argue that one call to FrodoKEM.DecS can be
used to implement U⊗m¯. Then we show that one call to U can be used to recover any choice
of the columns of S with probability 4/pi2, as long as it has at least one entry that is odd.
Let Trunc : Zq 7→ Z2B denote the map that takes x ∈ Zq to the integer represented by
the B most significant bits of the binary representation of x. We have, for any C1 ∈ Zm¯×nq ,
C2 = 0m¯×n¯, and any {zi,j}i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯] ⊆ Z2B :
UFrodoKEM.Dec : |C1〉|0m¯·n¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j〉 7→ |C1〉|0m¯·n¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + Trunc([C1S]i,j)〉. (10)
Above, [C1S]i,j represents the ij-th entry of C1S. If c1, . . . , cm¯ denote the rows of C1, then
[C1S]i,j = 〈ci, sj〉. Thus, Trunc([C1S]i,j) = LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci), the linear rounding function
with block size b = q/2B , which is an integer since q is a power of 2, and a = 0. Note that we
have also assumed that the plaintext is subtracted rather than added to the last register; this
is purely for convenience of analysis, and can easily be accounted for by adjusting Algorithm 1
(e.g., by using inverse-QFT instead of QFT.)
Discarding the second register (containing C2 = 0), the right-hand side of (10) becomes
|c1〉 . . . |cm¯〉
⊗
i∈[m¯],j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci)〉. (11)
Reordering the registers of (11), we get:
⊗
i∈[m¯]
|ci〉⊗
j∈[n¯]
|zi,j + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (ci)〉
 = U⊗m¯
⊗
i∈[m¯]
|ci〉
⊗
j∈[n¯]
|zi,j〉
 .
Thus, we can implement U⊗m¯ using a single call to FrodoKEM.DecS .
Next we show that for any particular j ∈ [n¯], a single call to U can be used to recover sj ,
the j-th column of S, with probability at least 4/pi2, as long as at least one entry of sj is
odd. To do this, we show how one use of U can be used to implement one phase query to
LRFsj ,0,q/2B . Then the result follows from the proof of Theorem 16.
Let |ϕ〉 = 2−B/2∑2B−1z=0 |z〉, and define
|φj〉 = |ϕ〉⊗(j−1) ⊗ 1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ωz2B |z〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉⊗(n¯−j).
Then for any c ∈ Znq , we have:
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
|z + LRFsi,0,q/2B (c)〉 =
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
|z〉 = |ϕ〉,
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since addition here is modulo 2B , and
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ωz2B |z + LRFsj ,0,q/2B (c)〉 =
1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ω
z−LRFsj ,0,q/2B (c)
2B |z〉.
Thus:
U(|c〉|φj〉) = |c〉|ϕ〉⊗(j−1) ⊗ 1√
2B
2B−1∑
z=0
ω
z−LRFsj ,0,q/2B (c)
2B |z〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉⊗(n¯−j)
= ω
−LRFsj ,0,q/2B (c)
2B |c〉|φj〉.
Thus, by the proof of Theorem 16, if we apply U to q−n/2
∑
c∈Znq |c〉|φj〉, Fourier transform
the first register, and then measure, assuming sj has at least one entry that is a unit3 we
will measure sj with probability at least pi2/4−O(d/q), where d = q/2Bdq/(q/2B)e − q = 0.
Thus, if we want to recover columns j1, . . . jm¯ of S, we apply our procedure for U⊗m¯,
which costs one query to FrodoKEM.DecS , to the state∑
c∈Znq
1√
qn
|c〉|φj1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗
∑
c∈Znq
1√
qn
|c〉|φjm¯〉,
Fourier transform each of the c registers, and then measure. J
3 since q is a power of 2, this is just an odd number
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